



Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War

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Since Pakistan was founded in 1947, its army has dominated the state. The military establishment has locked the country in an enduring rivalry with India, with the primary aim of wresting Kashmir from it. To that end, Pakistan initiated three wars over Kashmir-in 1947, 1965, and 1999-and failed to win any of them. Today, the army continues to prosecute this dangerous policy by employing non-state actors under the security of its ever-expanding nuclear umbrella. It has sustained a proxy war in Kashmir since 1989 using Islamist militants, as well as supporting non-Islamist insurgencies throughout India and a country-wide Islamist terror campaign that have brought the two countries to the brink of war on several occasions. In addition to these territorial revisionist goals, the Pakistani army has committed itself to resisting India's slow but inevitable rise on the global stage.

Despite Pakistan's efforts to coerce India, it has achieved only modest successes at best. Even though India vivisected Pakistan in 1971, Pakistan continues to see itself as India's equal and demands the world do the same. The dangerous methods that the army uses to enforce this self-perception have brought international opprobrium upon Pakistan and its army. And in recent years, their erstwhile proxies have turned their guns on the Pakistani state itself.

Why does the army persist in pursuing these revisionist policies that have come to imperil the very viability of the state itself, from which the army feeds? In *Fighting to the End*, C. Christine Fair argues that the answer lies, at least partially, in the strategic culture of the army. Through an unprecedented analysis of decades' worth of the army's own defense publications, she concludes that from the army's distorted view of history, it is victorious as long as it can resist India's purported drive for regional hegemony as well as the territorial status quo. Simply put, acquiescence means defeat. *Fighting to the End* convincingly shows that because the army is unlikely to abandon these preferences, Pakistan will remain a destabilizing force in world politics for the foreseeable future.

Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War Details

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Fair

From Reader Review Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War for online ebook

Ankur Vohra says

A well researched and documented book which gives you an insight into the workings of the Pakistani state and why over the years it has become the Epicentre of all that is wrong with this world. A must read for anyone who is interested in the Indian Subcontinent.

Zubair Qaseem says

Deserves nothing more than a single star. The biases of the author towards defaming Pakistan army is not hidden. The author clearly reflect the Indian point of view which is understandable but while writing a book one should present both side of picture. More ever some points were repeated again and again to malign a corporate institution, which has every right to defend it self, from which a rational mind can assume perfidious intentions.

Graham says

Nope, sorry, I can't do it. Beyond the repetition and endless citation of previous works - to the extent they crowd out the original thesis here, which seems potentially interesting - it is an absolutely maddening experience trying to read a book-length work featuring inline citations and explicative footnotes.

Perhaps the fault in this instance lies with the Oxford University Press (or my own pedantry), but regardless, it makes for a highly unpleasant reading experience. No opportunity to engage with the argument or a narrative, as the interruption from parentheticals is endless and constant.

Jonathan says

In this thoughtful survey of Pakistan's strategic culture, Professor Fair demonstrates that country's legitimate security concerns, but also that they are married to a revisionist anti-Indian and Islamo-nationalistic ideology. This world view permeates not only the armed forces but civil society as well, creating a nation that seems to be permanently at war which, in turn, allows the paramountcy of the army in Pakistan which, in fairness, is one of the very few competent and uncorrupted organizations there. Fair takes a historical viewpoint, tracing the rise of this culture back to pre-independence and partition days, especially in the role of the "two-nation theory." Pakistan's emphasis on armed strength, jihad and lack of flexibility in issues such as Kashmir makes it certain that the country will remain militaristic, poor and source of instability in South Asia for the foreseeable future. If this troubled region interests you, this book is a must-read, in spite of the fact that it's a bit of a slog.

Madiha Tallat says

her research methodology raises serious research ethics questions.

Shamsher Singh says

A very prolix account of psychology of the Pakistan Army. although the book gets boring with addition of numerous sources, the central theme remains interesting. Must say a definitive account of inner working methodology of Pakistan vis a vis ISI. A must read book if you want to know why Pakistan Army does what it does.

Yasin says

this book says the reality of pakistan government and its Inter-agency service. i really liked this book. i am still reading to the end.

Omar Ali says

A thorough and very well documented exposition of the Pakistan army's dominant strategic culture. I think she may slightly exaggerate the unanimity of this consensus. In actual fact the majority of officers are probably thinking far more about their plots and post-army jobs than about the strategic needs of Pakistan, but those who think they are thinking are indeed thinking exactly this.

Her conclusions seem unimpeachable: the army will not reform in return for X or Y amount of money or even minor territorial concessions. Nothing less than the fall of India will be enough. Since that seems less likely than GHQ believes, it is therefore going to be Pakistan that will fight to the end....sad, but most likely true.

ka?yap says

A well researched and scholarly work on Pakistan army's strategic culture, its ideological standpoint and how they influence its domestic and foreign policies. Shows the deep-rooted convictions and contradictions of the Pakistani State and the army.

Pakistan is an ideological Islamic state born out of a schism in the old Indo-Islamic civilisation of India. The idea of Pakistan grew out of a Muslim revivalist and nationalist atmosphere in the 19th century among the Urdu speaking elite in north India. The Two-nation theory posited the Hindus and Muslims as separate nations and identities. Pakistan's nationalism was founded on negation coupled with religion: rejecting old land for new, dismissing Hindu India for Muslim Pakistan.

So Pakistan since its creation has been driven by a quest for a culture of its own, that is not only different but in opposition to "Hindu India". Christine Fair, in this work shows the importance of this Islamic ideology

and the subsequent violent and "unsatisfactory" partition which led to the creation of Pakistan. These historical factors have determined the subsequent trajectory of Pakistan in both its development as a state and its difficult relations with India.

Based primarily upon the sources of the military publications and interviews, the author in this volume shows how the Pakistan army views itself as an ideological army that protects the not just the sovereignty of the state but the Islamic ideology on which it is based. This Islamic ideology based on an opposition to "Hindu India" has ever since driven the Pakistan army's quest towards parity with India in all respects. The author shows how the Pakistani army since the beginning has been driven by this civilisational and revisionist goal of resisting the "Hindu hegemony", no matter how unrealistic that goal maybe. But the fact is, despite its various insurmountable problems the Islamic Republic of Pakistan continues to endure. The conclusion from this, that of a state that is perpetually at war with India is quite stark.

Eugene Novikov says

Indispensable insofar as it authoritatively makes a very specific, very important point backed up by evidence and faultless reasoning: viz., that Pakistan's ideological commitment to a monomaniacally anti-Indian orientation is its *raison d'être*, overrides all other priorities, is fundamentally detached from reality, and isn't going anywhere. Can't make the case for this as great writing or particularly essential for a general audience -- it's basically an academic article, with all the turgid prose that implies, and is by no means a good intro to Pakistan issues -- but I certainly hope everyone in the foreign policy establishment reads it.

Tariq Mahmood says

Although written by an academic I found the arguments both compelling and intriguing. This book is an academic study of Pakistan army's view of the state of Pakistan and its self appointed role as the defender of not only the boundaries but also of its Islamic based ideology. Since Pakistan Army controls the state of Pakistan, it uses the state resources for its own corporate and institutional ends. Therefore as much as the state of Pakistan relies on its army, the Army also relies on the state for its own sustenance. Also this is probably the first book which spotlights the proper role of Pakistan Army as the real power in the state of Pakistan. Christine clearly defines the relationship vis-a-vis India; not winning, even repeatedly is not the same thing as losing, but simply giving up and accepting the status quo and India's supremacy is by definition is defeat for the Pakistani Army. Thus Pakistani generals would always prefer to take a calculated risk and be defeated than do nothing at all! A rather frightening conclusion indeed but does paint a pretty realistic view of the prevailing state of affairs.

States which have been colonies cannot progress without following a unique course in the World. Consider USA which has been a colony but has only progressed after proving its own unique developmental stamp on the World. They have their own sports, their own brand of democracy, their own corporations, their own academics, their own culture, media and film. This unique-ness sets them apart and keeps the others in awe giving them a certain mystique. Now in the case of the Pakistani army, it has not created any new path, but chosen to extend the policies of religious patronage exercised by its parent British Indian army, the difference being that while British had to accommodate Hinduism and Sikhism, Pakistani army only focuses on Islam. The only unique feature Pakistan introduces to the world is its ideology which is a state created in the name of Islam. So basically in order to Pakistan to make a difference in the world, a successful state

based on Islamic values has to be realised. Unfortunately this is an Islamist dream which goes against what majority Pakistanis reject. In divorcing Islam from its ideology Pakistanis lose the only differentiating feature, but following the Islamic ideology dream means further chaos. But the author completely misses a fundamental point as this belief in ideology, however skewed has yielded rich dividends for Pakistan Army as the most successful institute produced by Pakistan, which explains its insistence on civilians to follow the same ideology. Trouble is, most civilians in Pakistan just don't see any benefit in following this convoluted ideology which fuels a distrust between the Army and the Civilians.

Christine also covers the unique strategic security challenges faced by Pakistan in some comprehensive detail. It becomes quite clear that Pakistan was envisaged and has been used as a buffer state by not only the Anglo-Americans but the Pakistan army; which over time has eagerly supplemented this strategy with their own twisted interpretation of events. And while Christine explains how the Pakistanis countered Pashtun and Baluchi nationalistic movements by encouraging Islamist ones, thus making Islam a binding force for all Pakistanis, she fails to mention that no US president has ever visited Pakistan during its democratic periods; thus demonstrating their apprehension with Pakistani political leadership. I also agree with Christine that Pakistan never possessed and never will have enough of their resources to counter all the different nationalist movements so therefore there has to be a huge rethinking of this insecure defensive ideology and its clear to me that the dialogue has to happen within the Army and its apologists, since the civilians have so little influence over such matters in the land of the pure.

Christine also ignored the elephant in the room when explaining Pakistan Army's paranoid obsession when she fails to give proportionate weight-age to India's covert and overt actions in the 1971 war in East Pakistan. As most of her references are from articles after 1971, the writers must be affected adversely by a huge defeat against their arch enemy. Now to expect a proud and assured Pakistan army to accept an embarrassing defeat and move on is impossible to consider, especially when they are still in denial.

The fact that successive American governments have been overtly sympathetic when providing arms to Pakistani Army since independence even when completely aware of the Islamic anti Indian ideology propounded by the Army also means that the Americans must also take responsibility for their part in the creation of the monster. Considering the strategic and security situation in the country, the civilians cannot go against the army which at the moment is the only hope for the country unfortunately.

Sandeepan Mondal says

This is a must read book for international affairs aficionados, political analysts, or even a general reader with a keen interest in gaining a deeper understanding of a flawed nation state. Although the book heavily focusses on the Pakistan's army strategic culture and how it influences both its domestic and foreign policies, it also sheds light on what is wrong with today's Pakistan and reaffirms 'the insecurity, fear and loathing in Islamabad', the constant antagonistic attitude towards India and its persistent revisionism even in the face of defeat. After reading this book and witnessing parallel developments across the border, it becomes quite clear that Pakistan is an adamant theocratic state (Islam heavily influences the administrative machinery and laws) and the army has an overarching reach and influence over most of the civilian institutions which undermines the sanctity of a parliamentary democracy.

The author has rigorously explored, through comprehensive field work and literature review, the border issues that Pakistan faces with its neighbours, the conflict zones and provinces, the role of the civil society

within Pakistan, the 'nuclear shield' and 'proxy war' behind which Pakistan hides and justifies offensives, and its unwavering obsession with India that gets reflected in the provocative literature propagated among young army recruits (projecting India as a Kafir, Hindu nation which must be defeated at any cost following Allah's diktat). Despite the fact that Pakistan has repeatedly been vanquished in wars with India, Pakistani army does not treat those defeats as 'defeats' in true definition of the word. In fact, Fair highlights that its intentions have become more robust and taken a dangerous turn after the defeat in 1971; Pakistan has pursued more rigorously its nuclear proliferation strategy through tie-ups with China which (according to Pakistan) makes it equal to India, acts as a deterrent to any foreign attacks and maintains a balance of power within the Indian sub-continent. The author has also underlined that in the short-term it is difficult for Pakistan to successfully transition to a true parliamentary democracy and the eventual dissolution of Pakistani army's power over civilian institutions is an extremely remote possibility. Fair also provides scenarios wherein the transition to democracy is possible through both internal and external disruptions and discusses the likelihood of these events happening.

In a way, Pakistan presents a case study of a nation state that has neither completely embraced religion nor has been able to discard it completely in the interest of minorities (unlike that of Middle East), thus projecting itself as a befuddled country to the international community. The army, in particular, comes out as an institution that has weakened and exploited other institutions, politicians and change-makers only to grow more powerful each day. At the cost of the economic prosperity and political freedom, and its unflinching obsession with its nearest neighbour, the army has seriously undermined Pakistan's prospects as a flourishing nation and continues to do so.

Koshank says

Fighting to the end presents a comprehensive analysis of thought process behind the functioning of Pakistani Army & its attempts at grabbing more & more power in a so called democratic Pakistan. It makes an honest attempt at figuring out the evolution of strategic culture of Pakistan Army. The book revolves around the history of Pakistan as a nation & connects various important events to the development of its Army's strategy culture. It finally brings out the current & envisaged future implications of Pakistan Army's increasing power in the state, on various regional & global issues.

Manish Jaitly says

Christine has done well. Taking off from Hussain Haqqani's Between Mosque and Military, Christine goes on to highlight the faultlines within the Pak establishment and society. She goes on to explain in great detail how those faultlines were created and exploited by successive regimes and military chiefs to enhance personal gains and those of the entities they represented. A must read for people who want to understand how Pak came to be a 'jehadi terrorist' nation that it has become. Kudos!!

Hassaan Munir says

Let me sum this book up for you: "Pakistan started all wars, Pakistan lost all wars, Pakistan is sending militants to every corner of the world, Pakistan was never sincere in defeating the Soviets, Pakistan's military are jihadists with a myopic goal of toppling India."

It seems that Christine Fair has only recently wised up to the opportunity to sell lots of books in India, the world's third largest book market expected to become the largest in less than 10 years. It appears that strong profit motive drove her to write what Indians want to read. Those, like Professor Wendy Doniger of University of Chicago, who ignore this reality are punished by having their books withdrawn and pulped. No publisher wants to take this risk now. And authors who wish to get published have to understand it too.

Before writing and promoting this book, she said this in 2009: "Having visited the Indian mission in Zahedan, Iran, I can assure you they are not issuing visas as the main activity! Moreover, India has run operations from its mission in Mazar (through which it supported the Northern Alliance) and is likely doing so from the other consulates it has reopened in Jalalabad and Qandahar along the border. Indian officials have told me privately that they are pumping money into Baluchistan".

Talk about double standards and hypocrisy. I am glad I didn't spend any money on this book. It is a disgrace to nonpartisan scholarship.
